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Beyond Greenholtz: Federal Courts Expand
Due Process in Illinois Parole-Release Decisions
INTRODUCTION

In a line of cases beginning with Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex,' the United States
Supreme Court has adopted a policy against federal judicial
review of state parole-release decisions. This policy is based on
the nature of the parole-release determination, essentially a predictive judgment, based on appraisals of numerous factors by
experienced behavioral experts. This subjective determination
differs from judicial decision-making and cannot necessarily be
articulated in detailed judicial findings. 2 Therefore, the parolerelease decision is generally not an appropriate subject for judi3
cial review.
Greenholtz held that the mere existence of a parole system
4
does not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
Moreover, where the unique wording of a state statute does
create a legitimate expectation of parole, the inmate is entitled to
only minimal procedural protection. 5 Subsequent Supreme Court

1. 442 U.S 1 (1979). See also generally Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
2. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8.
3. "Our system of federalism encourages this state experimentation. If parole determinations are encumbered by procedures that states regard as burdensome and unwarranted, they may abandon or curtail parole." Id. at 13.
4. A state is under no constitutional obligation to establish a parole system. Moreover,
a conviction extinguishes an inmate's liberty interest to release; therefore, a parole candidate possesses no constitutional or inherent right to conditional release before the expiration of a valid sentence. Id. at 7. "[A] prisoner is not [however] wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
555 (1974). See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 450 U.S. 319 (1972) (religious freedom under first and
fourteenth amendments); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (right of access to
courts); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (due process regarding solitary confinement); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (due process regarding certain conditions of confinement).
5. Because no inherent constitutional protection for parole determination proceedings
exists, courts must look to the parole statute to determine what role, if any, constitutional
protections might play in the parole process. Most parole-release statutes provide inmates
with a "mere hope" or "unilateral expectation" of parole, which does not amount to a
protectible liberty interest. Only where the unique statutory language creates a legitimate
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decisions have continued to limit the role constitutional due pro-

6
cess plays in parole-release decision-making.
In contrast to the Court's clear policy of deference to state
parole-release decisions, federal courts in Illinois have strained to
become involved in reviewing parole denials by the Illinois Prisoner Review Board.7 This note will evaluate the impact of a series of federal cases which have progressively expanded due process protection afforded Illinois parole candidates, thereby imposing federal judicial review of Illinois Prisoner Review Board
decisions. It will first discuss the non-interventionist policy expressed by Greenholtz and its progeny. Next, the note will examine state parole-release statutes as interpreted by lower courts
following Greenholtz. Finally, it will critically examine the analytical approach of the federal courts in Illinois as they expand
the scope of judicial review of Illinois parole denial decisions.

claim of entitlement does a protectible right to parole exist. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7,
11, 12.
Where a state-created liberty interest in parole does exist, the parole procedure satisfies
the minimum due process requirements by affording a parole candidate an opportunity to
be heard and by providing the inmate with general reasons for parole denial. Id. at 16.
See infra text accompanying notes 20-27.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 30-44.
7. The current statutory provisions for Illinois parole appear in the Illinois Unified
Code of Corrections, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1003-3-1 to 1003-3-13 (1982). The specific
paragraph governing parole-release determinations is contained in § 1003-3-5. See infra
text accompanying note 60. These provisions are the result of numerous revisions since
the establishment of the General Adult Parole Act of 1895. See generally A. BRUCE, A.
HARNo, E. BURGESS & J. LANDESCO, THE WORKINGS OF THE INDETERMINATE-SENTENCING
LAW AND THE PAROLE SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS (1968) (extensive discussion of the history of the

parole system in Illinois).
Two amendments are of particular significance. Effective January 1, 1973, the legislature amended the entire statute to change and clarify various sections. Most importantly,
the present § 1003-3-5 clarifies the former broad charge to the Board to determine
"whether [the offender] is capable again of become a law-abiding citizen" by delineating
criteria against which the offender should be evaluated. Pusateri & Scott, Illinois' New
Unified Code of Corrections,61 ILL. B.J. 62, 63 (1972). See also Fields, Illinois Paroleand
Pardon Board Adult ParoleDecisions, 62 ILL B.J. 20 (1973). Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 808a (1963) with ILL REV. SAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(c) (1982).
In 1977, Illinois abandoned indeterminate sentencing and discretionary parole-release
in favor of determinate or flat-time sentencing. Prisoners sentenced under the new law
receive one day of good conduct credit for each day served in prison, subject to revocation
pursuant to violation of institutional regulations. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1003-3-1(a)(2),
-3-2(aX4), -6-3 (1982). See also Johnson v. Franzen, 77 Ill. 2d 513, 397 N.E.2d 825 (1979).
Consequently, the parole statute only applies to Illinois inmates sentenced under the law
in effect prior to the amendatory Act of 1977. ILL REV. STAT. §§ 1003-3-1(aXl), -3-1(aXl)(2),
-3-1(aX5) (1982). See generally P. BIGMAN, DISCRETION, DETERMINATE SENTENCING AND THE
ILLINOIS PRISONER REVIEW BOARD: A SHOTGUN WEDDING, (Chicago Law Enforcement
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BACKGROUND

Greenholtz and Its Progeny:
An Inmate's Liberty Interest in Parole-Release
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."8 Procedural due process
analysis involves a two-step inquiry: first, is there an interest
deserving of constitutional protection, and second, what degree
of process is required to protect that interest. 9 Application of this
analysis to parole-release decisions involves two questions: first,
whether a parole candidate has a legitimate expectation of parolerelease sufficient to constitute a liberty interest, and second, if so,
what specific procedural protections are required to assure due
process of law.1 0
In Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal Correctional
Complex," the United States Supreme Court observed that due
process protection under the Constitution rests upon a legitimate
claim of entitlement.' 2 The Court then rejected any claim of con-

Study Group 1979).
8. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
9. "The question is not merely the 'weight' of the individual's interest, but whether the
nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the 'liberty or property language'
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), quoted in
Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17 (1981). See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63
(1970) (due process and the termination of welfare benefits). See also cases cited infra
note 10.
10. Due process cases involving prison administrative proceedings include: Jago v.
Van Curen 454 U.S. 14 (1981) ("shock" parole rescission determination); Connecticut Bd.
of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981) (denial of life-term inmates' sentence commutation); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correct'l Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)
(parole-release determinations); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (inter-prison disciplinary transfer decisions); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) ("good-time" revocation decisions); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation determinations) and Morrissey v. Brewer, 48 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation decisions).
11. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
12. For discussion and critique of the Court's procedural due process analysis in
Greenholtz as compared with its approach in other contexts, see generally 48 CINN. U.L.
REV. 1098 (1979); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Due Process in Parole Release Hearings,28
KAN.L. REV. 635 (1980); 63 MARQUETTE L. REV. 665 (1980); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw Procedural Due Process - Hearings - Parole Release Determinations, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 1026 (1980); Note, ConstitutionalLaw - No ConstitutionallyProtected Right to Due
Process in Parole Release Hearings, 54 TUL L. REV. 774 (1980); Note, "Some Measure" of
Protection:Due Process in the Balance in Greenholtz, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 357 (1980).
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stitutional entitlement to parole, or any form of conditional
release, because a valid conviction, with all its procedural safe13
guards, extinguishes an inmate's liberty right.
According to the Court, the Constitution does not require the
states to establish a parole system. 14 The existence of a state
parole system merely provides the inmate with a unilateral
expectation that parole-release will be granted. 15 A uniquelyworded state statute, however, may create a legitimate expecta6
tion of parole-release warranting constitutional protection.
The Nebraska parole-release statute at issue in Greenholtz
involved discretionary parole. 17 The statutory language mandates
that upon Board determination of parole eligibility, the inmate's
release "shall" be granted "unless" one of the four designated
reasons to deny parole exists.1 8 The Court held that the "shall/
unless" formula created a presumptive expectancy of parole-

13. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 9. In support of a constitutionally protected interest in parole, the inmates
attempted to analogize the parole-release determination with Board decisions to revoke
both parole and probation, which the Court previously held required due process protection. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1982). The inmates argued that because a conditional liberty interest was at stake in
both release and revocation decisions, the two decisions should be accorded the same
constitutional protections.
The Court firmly rejected this argument, citing two inherent differences between revocation and release. A confined inmate who applies for parole possesses a mere hope of
freedom, and if parole is subsequently denied, remains incarcerated. An inmate who has
been granted parole, however, already enjoys a conditional liberty interest, and therefore,
possesses a legitimate expectation of retaining his conditional freedom if he abides by the
conditions of his release. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 9. The Court quoted Judge Friendly's observation that "there is a human difference between losing what one has and not
getting what one wants." Id. at 10 (quoting Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing",123 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1267, 1296 (1975)).
The second distinction the Court noted between parole-release and parole revocation
was in the nature of the decision-making. The decision to revoke parole is based upon a
retrospective factual question: whether the parolee actually violated his parole agreement. By contrast, the parole-release decision rests on mostly subjective appraisals, and
unlike the revocation decision, no specific facts mandate conditional freedom. Id. at 9-10.
Cf. id. at 19-20 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and id. at 26-29
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
16. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12. See infra note 18.
17. Nebraska law provides for both mandatory and discretionary parole. After serving the minimum term, less good-time credits, an inmate is eligible for discretionary
parole. Upon serving the maximum term, less good-time credits, an inmate is entitled to
discretionary parole. Greenholtz involved the discretionary parole-release statute. 442
U.S. at 4.
18. The Nebraska parole-release provision analyzed in Greenholtz reads as follows:
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release, which entitles the inmate to some measure of constitutional protection. The Court emphasized, however, that its
decision was based on the "unique" structure and language of
19
the Nebraska statute.
Upon concluding that the Nebraska legislature created a statutory entitlement subject to due process protection, the Court
proceeded to determine whether the procedures of the Nebraska
statute met minimum due process. 20 The Court rejected the contention that the Constitution required the parole board to summarize
or specify particular evidence on which it based its decision to
deny parole. 21 The inherent subjectivity of the parole-release
decision, based upon a combination of psychological factors,
facts, and experienced predictive judgments, precludes a traditional statement of findings. 22 Although discretionary judgments

Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender
who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the
opinion that his release should be deferred because:
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of
parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for law;
(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or
(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or other
training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a lawabiding life when released at a later date.
Id. at 11 (quoting NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1, 114(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 12.
20. "It is axiomatic that due process 'is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.' "Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at
481).
21. The Court's opinion addressed three procedures imposed by the Eighth Circuit
and challenged by the Nebraska Board of Parole. The Court first held that the Board's
practice of granting the inmate an initial personal interview sufficiently met minimum
due process guarantees; consequently, a full formal hearing for eligible inmates was constitutionally unnecessary. Id. at 14-15. In addition, the Court held that due process does
not require the Board to submit "a full explanation, in writing, of the facts relied on and
reasons for the Board's action denying parole." Id. at 6. See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. The Court also rejected the court of appeals' order requiring the Board to
provide written notice of the precise time of the hearing, reasonably in advance, together
with a list of factors that might be considered. The Board's own notice procedure
informed the inmate in advance of the month during which the interview would be held,
thereby allowing time to secure letters or statements, and provided the exact time of the
hearing on the day it was held. The Court found this notice procedure constitutionally
sufficient. Greenholtz, 442 at 14 n.6.
22. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8, 13.
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are subject to some margin of error, 23 the Constitution does not
ensure error-free standards of review. 24 Flexible due process provides the procedural safeguards necessary to minimize the risk
of erroneous decision-making. 25 According to Greenholtz, the
Nebraska procedures, which provided inmates with a preprinted
denial form on which general reasons for parole denial were
checked off, 26 sufficiently met minimum due process require27

ments.
In a vigorous dissent, 28 Justice Marshall observed that the
parole statutes of many jurisdictions are patterned after the
Model Penal Code and include the application of similarly enumerated criteria in parole-release determinations. He suggested
that under the majority's analysis, the inclusion of any such factor necessarily creates a protectible expectation of release, regardless of the particular statutory wording. 29 Despite Marshall's

23. Id. at 13.
24. "Because of the broad spectrum of concerns to which [due process] must apply,
flexibility is necessary to gear the process to the particular need; the quantum and quality of process due in a particular situation depend upon the need to serve the purpose of
minimizing the risk of error." Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 40 n.23 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
27. The Board had followed Nebraska's statutory procedure by supplying inmates
with a denial form containing a printed list of reasons for denying parole. In addition to
a set of general explanations for parole denial, the Board checked off a general list of
recommendations for corrective behavior. The Court held that "nothing in the due process concepts as they have thus far evolved ...requires the Parole Board to specify the
particular 'evidence' in the inmate's file or at his interview on which it rests the discretionary determination that an inmate is not ready for condition release." Id. at 15.
The Board's procedure of supplying the inmate with general reasons and behavior
recommendations satisifed due process. The Court cautioned that requiring the Board to
provide a summary of the evidence would make the discretionary system of parole tantamount to an adversary proceeding. The parole-release decision and traditional judicial
decision-making constitute inherently different functions in the administration of justice
and do not require the same degree of due process. Therefore, parole-release decisions are
rarely proper subjects of judicial review. Id. at 8; see also Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 464.
Another factor in the decision to afford only a modicum of due process protection to
parole-release candidates was the Court's concern that burdensome procedural requirements might dissuade states from offering parole. The Court preferred to encourage
experimental state parole systems. Id.
The Court rejected the stricter due process protections required in decisions to revoke
parole, probation and good-time credits. Revocation procedures are primarily designed to
elicit specific facts, whereas the parole-release decisions rests on subjective predictive
determinations within the Board's discretion. Therefore, parole-release decisions require
less constitutional protection than revocation procedures. Id. at 9-10, 14. See supra note
15.
28. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
29. Justices Brennan and Stevens joined in Justice Marshall's partial dissenting opin-

19831

Illinos Parole-Release

885

emphasis on the explicit standards contained in the parole statutes of forty-seven states, the Greenholtz majority rejected such
an expansive interpretation of an inmate's liberty interest in
parole.
In Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat,30 the Supreme
Court stressed the narrowness of its holding in Greenholtz and
restricted the factors federal courts may take into account in
determining whether a state's conditional release statute creates
a constitutional entitlement. Life-term inmates in Dumschat
argued that the Board of Pardons' practice 31 of granting approximately seventy-five percent of the applications for commutation
of life sentences 32 created a legitimate expectation of release,
thereby requiring the Board to explain its reasons for denial. The
Court rejected the establishment of constitutional protections
based on the statistical likelihood of obtaining release, 3 3 and
ion. Despite the dissenters' criticism, the Court consistently emphasized its reliance on
the unique "shall/unless" mandate and de-emphasized the criteria applied in the parole
decision in establishing the basis for affording Nebraska inmates constitutional protection. Id. at 22, 30 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). But see id. at 12; Dumschat, 452 U.S.
at 463, 466.
In a partially concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Powell also disagreed with
the majority's conclusion that the application of the due process clause to parole-release
determinations depends upon the particular wording of the statute which governs the

deliberations of the Parole Board. He would have held that the mere existence of a parole
system sufficiently invokes constitutional protections of the due process clause. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 18-10 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
31. The Connecticut Board of Pardons has the power to commute the sentences of life
inmates by shortening the minimum prison term, which consequently expedites parole
eligibility. This authority is derived from the following statute, which reads in pertinent
part:
(a) Jurisdiction over the granting of, and the authority to grant, commutations
of punishment or releases, conditioned or absolute, in the case of any person
convicted of any offense against the state shall be vested in the board of
pardons.
Id. at 460 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-26 (1981)).
The inmates sought a declaratory judgment that the Board's failure to provide a written statement of reasons for denying commutation violated their rights guaranteed by
the due process clause. The Court rejected all three of the inmates' arguments, holding
first, that inmates possessed no constitutional right to commutation; second, the Board's
consistent practice of granting commutations to most life inmates did not create a legitimate entitlement; and, third, the language of the Connecticut statute created no liberty
interest.
32. This case involved denials of commutations, not parole. Parole determinations are
made by the Board of Parole, a separate body. Id. at 460 n.3.
33. The inmates argued that the Board had created an "unwritten common law" by
consistently granting commutations to most life inmates, which sufficiently created a

protectible liberty interest. The Court disagreed, stating that "statistical probabilities
standing alone generate no constitutional protections; a contrary conclusion would triv-
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held that the constitutional entitlement can derive only from statutes or other rules which explicitly define the duties of the
decision-making body3 4 The Court reiterated that in Greenholtz,
the unique "shall/unless" wording of the Nebraska parole statute, mandating release absent a specific finding, was what had
created a protectible right.3 5 By contrast, the Connecticut commutation statute empowered the Board with absolute discretion,
and consequently did not provide a state-created liberty interest
worthy of constitutional protection.3 6
The Supreme Court articulated a further limitation on the
source of a prisoner's claimed liberty interest in Jago v. Van
Curen,37 when it reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision that an
inmate's reliance on "mutually explicit understandings," could
create a constitutionally protected liberty interest. 38 Although
"mutually explicit understandings" may determine the existence
of a constitutionally protected property interest based on principles of contract law, such principles are not relevant to the existence of a liberty interest in the context of prisoner parole. 39 The
Court based its decision on the broad discretion and flexibility

ialize the Constitution." Id. at 465.
34. Id.
35. "When the Nebraska statutes directed that inmates who are eligible for parole
'shall' be released 'unless' a certain finding has been made, the statutes created a right."
Id. at 466-67. "In Greenholtz... we did no more than apply the unique Nebraska statute."

Id. at 463.
36. The Court noted that commutation and parole-release decisions share characteristics which preclude federally-created constitutional entitlement because both are primarily based on "purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future behavior by those
entrusted with the decision." Id. at 464.
37. 454 U.S. 15 (1981) (per curiam).
38. Under the law in effect when Jago was convicted, he would have become eligible
for parole in March 1976. In 1974, the state enacted a "shock parole" statute which made
first offenders who had served more than six months in prison for non-violent crimes
eligible for early parole. Jago was approved for "shock parole," completed prison prerelease classes and was measured for civilian clothes. Before his conditional release, the
Board rescinded its early decision to grant "shock parole," because it discovered that
Jago had misrepresented material facts in his interview and in his parole plan. Jago
alleged that he was constitutionally entitled to a hearing to explain his false statements.
Id. at 14-15.
39. The concept of "mutually explicit understandings" arose in the context of the fourteenth amendment's protection of property interests in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972). Although a property interest in employment may be created by implied contract
(see, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 571-72 (1972)), Jago refused to extend contractual principles to determine the existence of a constitutionally protected liberty interest with regard to parole. In accordance
with its Dumschat holding that no unwritten common law could create a liberty interest,
the Court determined that the general law of contracts, including "mutually explicit
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necessary in the administration of penal systems, which would
be rendered ineffective if any decision regarding an individual
inmate could result in an implied contract thereby necessitating
40
due process protection.
The Greenholtz-Dumschat-Jagotrilogy illustrates the Supreme Court's determination to prevent federal judicial review of
most discretionary decisions made by state penal authorities.
The Court limited the constitutional protection afforded parole-release
decisions at both stages of the due process analysis. 41 With
regard to the question of whether state action sufficiently implicates the due process clause, the Court limited the sources of constitutionally protected liberty interests. Beginning with the principle that no inmate possesses a constitutional right to early
release, Greenholtz restricted the finding of a protectible expectation of parole to uniquely-worded legislation which provides prisoners with a statutory presumption of release. 42 Dumschat limited the finding of a protectible liberty interest to state statutes
and rules, holding that statistical probabilities of early release do
not create a liberty interest. In addition Dumschat re-emphasized
the unique "shall/unless" statutory language which created a
liberty interest in Greenholtz.4 3 Jago further restricted the source
of a protectible right to parole-release: mutually explicit under44
standings do not create a legitimate expectation of release.
In addition to limiting the sources creating a liberty interest,
the Court demonstrated its federal non-interventionist policy
with regard to parole-release determinations by the degree of procedural protection required under the fourteenth amendment. If a
state-created liberty interest in parole-release does exist, a modicum of procedural protection is necessary. The rationale under
Greenholtz,Dumschat and Jago is clear: the reasons underlying
most discretionary decisions of experienced penal administrators
need not be justified to the federal courts.

understandings," played no part in the creation of protectible liberty interests. 454 U.S. at
18-20.
40. "[T]o hold as we are urged to do that any substantial deprivation imposed by
prison authorities triggers the protections of the Due Process Clause would subject to
judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the
business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts." Id. at 19 (quoting
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)) (emphasis in original).
41. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 11-26 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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Lower Courts' Analyses of
State ParoleRelease Statutes
In Greenholtz, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the
applicability of due process to each state's parole statute must be
determined on a "case-by-case" basis. 45 The Nebraska statute
analyzed in Greenholtz is unique in its "shall/unless" formula.
Other state parole-release statutes analyzed by courts following
Greenholtz are of three distinct types.
One group of parole-release statutes vests the Board with
broad discretion. 46 These statutes establish the mere possibility

45. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12.
46. See Schuemann v. Colorado State Bd. of Adult Parole, 624 F.2d 172. (10th Cir.
1980), construing CoO. REV. STAT. § 17-2-201(3)(b) (1978), which reads in pertinent part:
The board may parole any person who is sentenced or committed to a state
penitentiary, when such a person has served his minimum sentence less time
allowed for good behavior and there is a strong and reasonable probability that
the person will not thereafter violate the law and that his release from institutional custody is compatible with the welfare of society.
Candelaria v. Griffin, 641 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1981), construed N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-2110(A) (1979), which states in relevant part:
The board may release on parole any person confined in any correctional institution... when the prisoner gives evidence of having secured gainful employment of satisfactory of self support, and the board finds in its opinion the prisoner can be released without detriment to himself or the community.
Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1980) construed V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 4604
(Supp. 1978), which reads in pertinent part:
If it appears to the Board of Parole... that there is a reasonable probability that
such applicant will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws and if
in the opinion of the Board such release is not incompatible with the welfare of
society, the Board may, in its discretion, authorize the release of such applicant
on parole.
Wagner v. Gilligan, 609 F.2d 866 (6th Cir. 1979), cited with approval in Sharp v. Leonard, 611 F.2d 136 (6th Cir. 1979), construed OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2967.03 (Page 1977),
which states in relevant part:
The authority may... grant a parole to any prisoner, if in its judgment there is
reasonable ground to believe that, if the . . . prisoner is paroled, such action
would further the interests of justice and be consistent with the welfare and
security of society.
Shirley v. Chestnut, 603 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1979), cited with approval in Phillips v.
Williams, 608 P.2d 1131 (Okla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980), construed OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 57, §§ 332, 354 (West 1971), which establishes a three-tier system for parole
release, contingent on an initial recommendation by the Correctional Review Committee,
followed by the Parole Board's recommendation to the Governor, who retains the ultimate power to grant parole. The Board's only statutory guidance in recommending
parole is that the Board act as the public interest requires.
Robinson v. Mabry, 476 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Ark. 1979), construed ARK. STAT. ANN. §
43-2808 (1977), which provides in pertinent part: 'The Parole Board may release on parole
any individual eligible ...when in its opinion there is reasonable probability the prisoner
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of parole and do not require the granting of parole upon a showing of any particular facts. The statutory language includes the
permissive auxiliary "may." Typically, the Board's sole statutory
guidance in determining parole eligibility is that it act in the
public interest. Courts construing this type of parole-release statute have unanimously held that such language creates no liberty
47
interest on which prisoners may ground due process claims.
A second class of parole-release statutes includes the words
"when" and "shall" in the statutory framework. Three courts
have held that their respective statutes create no protectible entitlement to parole; 48 one jurisdiction reached a contrary result,
discerning sufficient similarity with the Greenholtz statute to
find a legitimate expectation of release.49 That court's analogy

can be released without detriment to the community or himself."
Austin v. Armstrong, 473 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Nev. 1979) and Severance v. Armstrong, 96
Nev. 836, 620 P.2d 369 (1980), construed NEV. REv. STAT. § 213.1099 (1979), which provides
in relevant part:
[T]he board may release on parole a prisoner otherwise eligible for parole ...
only if, from all the information known to the board, it appears to the board: (a)
That there is reasonable probability that such prisoner will live and remain at
liberty without violating the laws; and (b) That such release is not incompatible
with the welfare of society.
47. "[T]he Colorado parole statute gives the Board broad discretion and does not
require the granting of parole upon a showing of any particular facts." Scheumann v.
Colorado State Bd. of Adult Parole, 624 F.2d at 175; "Nebraska's 'shall... unless' system
appears to be quite unusual ... New Mexico's parole system contains no 'shall... unless'
directive to the parole board." Candelaria v. Griffin, 641 F.2d at 869, 870; "Unlike the
Nebraska statute... [the Ohio] statute does not mandate a presumption of parole release
" Wagner
... v. Gilligan, 609 F.2d at 867. "The absence of mandated state-law standardsboth for release eligibility as well as for eligibility to be considered for parole releasedoes set Oklahoma apart from Nebraska..." Phillips v. Williams, 608 P.2d at 1135.
48. See Williams v. Briscoe, 641 F.2d 274 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 854 (1981),
construing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.. art. 42.12, § 15(a), (f) (Vernon 1979), which provides in pertient part: "A parole shall be ordered only for the best of society ... when the
Board believes that he is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen
... [with the approval of the Governor]." (Emphasis added.)
Averhart v. Tutsie, 618 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1980), following Indiana law as interpreted in
Murphy v. Indiana Parole Bd., 397 N.E.2d 259 (Ind. 1979), construed IND. CODE § 11-1-9
(1979), which reads in relevant part: "A prisoner shall be placed on parole.., only when
the Indiana parole board believes that he is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a
law-abiding citizen." (Emphasis added.)
Campbell v. Montana State Bd. of Pardons, 470 F. Supp. 1301 (D. Mont. 1979),
construed MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-201 (1) (1978), which provides in pertinent part: "[T]he
board shall release on parole ...

any [eligible] person . . . when in its opinion there is

reasonable possibility that the prisoner can be released without deteriment to himself or
to the community." (Emphasis added.)
49. See Williams v. Missouri Bd. of Probation and Parole, 661 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1981),
Cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1621 (1982), construing Mo. REv. STAT. § 549.261 (1979), which
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appears justified given the statutory mandate that the Board
"shall release" the inmate when detailed regulatory guidelines
50
are met.
The third category of parole-release statutes contains negative
mandatory language. 5 1 Rather than provide for presumptive re-

reads in relevant part: "When in its opinion there is reasonable probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the community or to himself, the board shall
release[him] on parole..." (Emphasis added.)
In addition to the statutory guidelines, the Missouri Board adopted detailed guidelines
to aid in its parole-release decisions. See 13 C.S.R. § 80-2.010(5) (1980). The court of
appeals thus concluded that the Missouri law providing that when the statutory and
regulatory guidelines are met the inmate shall be released on parole gives rise to the
same protectible entitlement as the Nebraska scheme, providing that the prisoner shall
be paroled unless certain findings are made.
50. See supra note 49.
51. See Slocum v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 678 F.2d 940 (11th Cir.
1982); accord Jackson v. Reese, 608 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1979); Houser v. Morris, 518 F.
Supp. 873 (N.D. Ga. 1981) construing GA. CODE § 42-9-42 (1979), which reads in pertinent
part: "No prisoner shall be ... placed on parole until and unless the board shall find that
there is a reasonable possibility that . . . his release will be compatible with his own
welfare and society." (Emphasis added.)
Staton v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1757 (1982), cited
with approval in Hunter v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 674 F.2d 847 (11th Cir.
1982), construing FLA. STAT. § 947.18 (1981), which provides in relevant part:
No inmate shall be placed on parole until and unless the commission shall find
that there is a resonable probability that, if he is placed on parole, he will live
and conduct himself as a respectable and law-abiding person and that his
release will be compatible with his own welfare and the welfare of society.
(Emphasis added.)
Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1979), construed N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i2(c)
(McKinney 1978), which reads in relevant part:
Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will
live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not
incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.
(Emphasis added.) In addition, the New York Parole Board supplemented the parole statute with written guidelines governing its parole decisions. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-c, i
(McKinney 1978).
Johnston v. Alabama Pardon & Parole Bd., 530 F. Supp. 589 (M.D. Ala. 1982), cited
with approvalin Gaines v. Alabama, 415 So. 2d (Ala. Crim. App. 1982), construing ALA.
CPDE § 15-22-26, 28(d) (1975), which provides in pertinent part:
No prisoner shall be released on parole merely as a reward for good conduct or
efficient performance of duties assigned in prison, but only if the board.., is of
the opinion that... his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society.
No prisoner shall be released on parole except by a majority vote of the board,
nor unless the board is satisfied that he will be suitably employed in selfsustaining employment or that he will not become a public charge if so
released.
(Emphasis added.)

1983]

Illinos Parole-Release

lease, such statutes direct the Board of Parole not to grant parole
unless certain determinations are made by the Board. Except for
the Seventh Circuit's construction of the Illinois parole-release
statute, 52 each court analyzing its respective state statute distinguished the "release... shall not be granted ... but... if' or "no

prisoner shall be released.., until and unless" language from
the unique "shall order ... release unless" directive contained in
53
the Nebraska statute analyzed in Greenholtz.

Scott: Section 1003-3-5(c) Creates a Liberty
Interest in Parole-Release
Prior to Greenholtz, the Seventh Circuit had held that the mere
existence of a state parole system invoked the protection of the
fourteenth amendment. 54 In addition, that court held that minimum due process required that Illinois parole candidates be
given specific reasons for denial of parole-release. 55 Greenholtz
56
explicitly rejected both holdings.
57
United States ex rel. Scott v. Illinois Paroleand PardonBoard
provided the Seventh Circuit with the opportunity to reconsider
the Illinois parole-release statute in light of Greenholtz. Scott
had served eleven years of a twenty-five to forty year sentence
for murder. He appealed the district court's denial of habeas cor-

52. See infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
53. "While many of the provisions structuring the [Georgia] board's exercise of its
discretion include mandatory language [sections omittedl--there is a critical distinction

between 'a scheme that requires release 'unless' adverse findings based on [specific] criteria are made' [and] a scheme that simply obligates the board to consider such criteria in
exercising its discretion." Slocum v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 678 F.2d at
941; "The 'shall/unless' formula was decisive for the Court. It is apparent that New
York's parole provisions, unlike Nebraska's, do not establish a scheme whereby parole
shall be ordered unless specified conditions are found to exist." Boothe v. Hammock, 605
F.2d at 664; "The Alabama statutes, as the Texas and Georiga parole statutes, do not
contain any language similar to that in the Nebraska statute, which mandates parole
unless one of the four exceptions arises." Johnston v. Alabama Pardon & Parole Bd., 530
F. Supp. at 590.
54. United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 914 (1976).
55. Id. at 804.
56. "That the state holds out the possibility of parole provides no more than a mere
hope that the benefit will be obtained." 442 U.S. at 11 (emphasis in original). [W]e find
nothing in the due process concepts as they have thus far evolved that requires the
Parole Board to specify the particular "evidence" in the inmate's file or at his interview
on which it rests the discretionary determination that an inmate is not ready for conditional release. Id. at 15.
57. 669 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 468 (1982).
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pus, alleging that the Illinois Parole and Pardon Board had provided him with a constitutionally deficient statement of reasons
for his denial of parole. In order to determine whether Scott could
claim procedural protection under the due process clause, the circuit court looked to the language and structure of the statute
itself to decide whether it provided Illinois inmates with a legitimate expectation of release. 58 Section 1003-3-5(c) 59 of the Illinois
parole statute reads as follows:
The Board shall not parole a person eligible for parole if it
determines that:
(1) there is a substantial risk that he will not conform to
reasonable conditions of parole; or
(2) his release at the time would deprecate the seriousness
of his offense or promote disrespect for the law; or
(3) his release would have a substantially adverse effect
60
on institutional discipline.
Comparing the language of section 1003-3-5(c) with the Nebraska statute's "shall/unless" language, 61 the Seventh Circuit
construed the "shall not/if' wording as stating the Nebraska
rule in the negative, similarly requiring the Board to grant
parole in the absence of specified reasons, thereby creating a legitimate expectation of parole-release. 62 The court acknowledged
that the "shall not/if' language could reasonably be read as listing the circumstances under which the Board must deny parole,
leaving it free to exercise discretion in the absence of those circumstances. Under that construction Illinois inmates would possess no legitimate expectation of parole-release and therefore no
due process protection would be required.6 3 Despite Illinois and
federal cases to the contrary, 64 the Seventh Circuit interpreted
the statute, Council Commentary, and Board rules as creating
the same legitimate right to parole as that granted by the unique

58.
59.

Scott, 669 F.2d at 1188.
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5-(c) (1982).

60. Id. (Emphasis added.)
61. Comparesupra note 18 with supra text accompanying note 60.
62. The court viewed the Illinois parole-release statute as "practically a mirror image
of the Nebraska statute." 669 F.2d at 1188.
63. Id. at 1189.
64. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text for Illinois cases. See supra notes
51-53 and accompanying text for federal cases.
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mandate of the Greenholtz statute. 5
Having concluded that the Illinois parole-release statute afforded prisoners a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the
court next determined whether the Board's statement of reasons
accompanying Scott's parole denial sufficiently satisfied the
requirements of due process. 66 Scott had received the following
reasons for the Board's denial of parole:
The above action is taken based on the Board's feeling
that release at this time would deprecate the severity of
the crime for which you were convicted namely, Murder,
receiving a 25-40 year sentence. Accordingly, your minimum sentence of 25 years, does not make you eligible to
67
be provided with a release date under the new law.

Scott held that these reasons were constitutionally inadequate.
The court reinstated the test of constitutional sufficiency it previously adopted prior to Greenholtz,68 requiring the Board to

65. The Illinois Prisoner Review Board is obligated to promulgate rules pursuant to
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-2(d) (1981). Rule V, entitled "Basis for Denying Parole,"
provides a list of factors the Board should consider as a basis for parole denial under
§ 1003-3-5. See Scott, 669 F.2d at 1189 n.6. The court reasoned that such factors were
intended to be all-inclusive, and consequently required the Board to grant parole-release

unless one of the enumerated factors underlied its decision to deny parole. Id. at 1189.
In addition to Board Rules, Scott construed the following Council Commentary accompanying § 1003-3-5(c) as providing additional support for its conclusion that the Board
must grant parole-release in the absence of the statutory criteria:
Subparagraph (c) expands the vague charge to the Board to determine "whether
[the offender] is capable again of becoming a law-abiding citizen." Section 203
(repealed). The Board should state one or more of the reasons listed in subparagraph (c) as a basis for its decision denying parole as required by subparagraph
(f). Additional reasons may also be stated.
ILL. REv. SWAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(c) (Council Commentary) (Smith-Hurd 1982). According
to the court, the language of the Commentary suggests that reasons given for parole
denial other than those specified in the statute are in addition to, and not in place of, the
statutory reasons relied upon by the Board. Thus, if the Board fails to provide a statutory
reason for parole denial, the court concluded, § 1003-3-5 mandates parole-release. 669 F.2d
at 1190.
66. 669 F.2d at 1190.
67. Id.
68. In Richerson, 525 F.2d at 804, the Seventh Circuit had adopted the test articulated
by the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of
Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 934 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974):
To satisfy minimum due process requirements a statement of reasons should be
sufficient to enable a reviewing body to determine whether parole has been
denied for an impermissible reason or for no reason at all. For this essential
purpose, detailed findings of fact are not required, provided the Board's decision
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inform an inmate "what in his record was felt by the Board to
warrant his denial and why." 69 Consequently, the Seventh Cir-

cuit held the Board's general statement of reasons constitutionally deficient.70
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Does Section 1003-3-5(c) Create a Protectible
Liberty Interest in Parole?
The Scott decision represents a significant departure from the
Supreme Court's policy of minimal federal judicial intervention
in state parole-release decision-making. Acknowledging that the
Illinois parole-release statute "can be read" as either creating or
not creating a legitimate expectancy of release in parole, 7 ' the
Seventh Circuit strained to infer a protectible liberty interest,
despite the plain language of the statute, legislative intent, Illinois case law, and the policy expressed by Greenholtz and its
progeny.
Moreover, the vital connection between Nebraska's "shall/unless" mandate and the Greenholtz Court's finding of a liberty
interest had previously been recognized by the Seventh Circuit
itself.7

2

By analogizing the Nebraska and Illinois parole sta-

tutes, Scott ignored the substantial difference between "shall
release unless" and "shall not release if" and placed undue
emphasis on the parallel criteria of the statutes, thus evidencing
reliance on Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Greenholtz
rather than the opinion of the Court.
In order to bypass the plain import of the Illinois statute's
is based upon consideration of all relevant factors and it furnishes to the
inmate both the grounds for the decision ... and the essential facts upon which
the Board's inferences are based.
69. Scott, 669 F.2d at 1191.
70. The court reasoned as follows: "[I]f the Board does grant parole to some inmates
whose commitment offense is murder, then its refusal to do so here, unless it is completely arbitrary, must be for some other reason that the fact Scott was convicted of
murder." Id.
71. Id.at 1189.
72. In Averhart v. Tutsie, 618 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1980), the Seventh Circuit followed
the Indiana Supreme Court's holding that the state's parole-release statute created no
protectible interest. See supra note 48 for the Indiana statute in pertinent part. The court
of appeals distinguished the Greenholtz finding of a state-created liberty interest in
parole: "The Court identified as crucial the language of the statute which mandated that
the Nebraska Parole Board shall grant parole to an inmate unless one of the four enumerated negative determinations are made." 618 F.2d at 481 (emphasis in original).
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"shall not" language, Scott "simply"73 inverted the decisive language preceding the factors requiring parole denial. There is,
however, a material difference between Nebraska's statutory
scheme in which "the structure of the provision together with the
use of the word 'shall' binds the Board of Parole to release an
inmate unless any one of the four specifically designated reasons
are found,' 74 and the Illinois legislature's contrary requirement
that the Board "shall not" order parole if certain conditions are
met. The Nebraska statute provides for presumptive parolerelease; in contrast, the Illinois statute provides for presumptive
parole denial. 75 The Seventh Circuit's expansive interpretation
of the Illinois parole-release provisions permits unwarranted federal judicial scrutiny of the highly subjective parole-release decision, a decision the Illinois legislature has entrusted to the experience and skill of the administrative body7 6 best equipped to
render "an 'equity' type judgment that cannot always be articulated in traditional judicial] findings." 77
In the course of construing section 1003-3-5(c), the court purported to rely on the Council Commentary 78 which explained the

73. 669 F.2d at 1188.
74. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12 (emphasis added).
75. In support of its determination that the Illinois parole-release statute sufficiently
approximated the Nebraska statute to provide a state-created liberty interest, the court
noted that "[e]ven the specified conditions under which release is to be deferred are the
same, except for the fact that the Nebraska statute includes an additional reason for
deferral which Illinois' does not." Scott, 669 F.2d at 1188. The relevance of this point is
unclear. The Seventh Circuit seems to follow Justice Marshall's dissent by focusing on
the common criteria, rather than on the contrary statutory language which was decisive
for the Greenholtz majority. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. The Seventh
Circuit appears to have been straining to return its rejected Richerson holding. The court
could have readily concluded that a statutory mandate directing that the Board "shall
order [an eligible inmate's] release" differs from a legislative command requiring that the
Board "shall not parole" a person eligible for parole. Compare supra note 18 with text
accompanying note 60. There was no need for the court to look for further guidance from
the Council Commentary and the Board's own Rules Governing Parole. See People v.
Robinson, 89 Ill. 2d 469, 475, 433 N.E.2d 674, 677 (1982) (judicial construction of legislative intent).
76. The ten members of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board are required to have had
at least 5 years of actual experience in the fields of penology, corrections work,
law enforcement, sociology, law, education, social work, medicine, psychology,
other behavioral sciences, or a combination thereof. At least 5 members so
appointed [by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate] must
have had at least 3 years experience in the field of juvenile matters.
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-1(b) (1982).
77. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8.
78. See supra note 65.
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legislative intent. The court, however, failed to address the implications of the commentary's first sentence 79 which indicates
that section 1003-3-5(c) was enacted to clarify the factors previously used by the Board in its discretionary parole-release decision.80 Thus, the discretion exercised by the Board in its
decision-making was retained, not restricted, by the addition of
section 1003-3-5(c). The new section merely codified general criteria in order to make the parole-release decision less mysterious to
the eligible inmate and the general public. 81 The first sentence of
the Council Commentary supporting legislative preservation of
Board discretion in parole decision-making, in conjunction with
the plain meaning of the "shall not" language of section 1003-35(c), illustrates that the legislature intended to provide presumptive parole denial, rather than presumptive parole-release.
Illinois case law provides further support that the legislature
retained and clarified the Board's discretion in parole-release
determinations when it set forth the criteria contained in section
1003-3-5. The Illinois Supreme Court has classified parole as a
matter of grace and clemency, rather than of legislative entitlement. 82 The court has clearly stated that "parole is [not] mandatory because the eligibility-requirements are met." 83 Referring
specifically to section 1003-3-5(c), an Illinois appellate court described the Board's great discretion as limited only by the statutory directive that "the Board must not parole a person eligible"
if one of the three statutory criteria exists.8 4 Thus, Illinois courts

79. Id.
80. Senator Londrigan twice explained the purpose behind the Senate amendment
eventually enacted as § 1003-3-5: "[Tlhis is just language clarifying interpreting the language of the new Bill which in itself seeks to clarify language of the Code of Correction."
House concurs in Senate amendment: Hearings on H.B. 1086, "House Bill 1086 ...clarifies ... further the language of the Code of Corrections. The original purpose of the
legislation was to clarify the Code of Corrections." The House motion to accept the Governor's recommendation for change prevailed, Hearings on H.B. 1086, P.A. 939, 78th Ill.
Gen. Ass. amending ch. 38, § 1003-3-5, effective January 1, 1973.
See Fields, Illinois Paroleand Pardon Board Adult ParoleDecisions, 62 ILL B.J. 20, 21

(1973) (where Theodore P. Fields, past Chairman of the Parole and Pardon Board (Jan.
1971 to Aug., 1972) wrote: "This statute sets forth the general criteria for denying the
parole that have been followed by the Board for some time.") See also supra note 7.
81. See Fields, supra note 80, at 23.
82. See, e.g., People v. Hawkins, 54 Ill. 2d 247, 252, 296, N.E.2d 725, 727 (1973); People
ex rel. Abner v. Kinney, 30 111. 2d 201, 205, 195 N.E.2d 651,653 (1964).
83. People ex rel.Jones v. Brantley, 45 Ill.
2d 335, 337, 259 N.E.2d 33,34 (1970).
84. People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos, 42 Ill.
App. 3d 812, 818, 356 N.E.2d 798, 804 (1976)
(emphasis added). The court noted that an evaluation based on these criteria involves
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have consistently described the Board's authority in parolerelease determinations as discretionary. 85
Scott dismissed Illinois case law as inconclusive because it
was not directly on point.86 Although the state courts' discusof the Illinois parole statute does constitute dicta with regard to
the precise issue raised in Scott, the Illinois judiciary's interpretion of parole presents persuasive authority against finding a
87
state-created liberty interest in parole-release.
Before the Seventh Circuit decided Scott, federal district courts
had held that the Illinois parole-release statute did not create a
liberty interest, following the analysis of Greenholt. 88 In 1980,
the District Court for the Central District of Illinois addressed an
attack on the constitutional sufficiency of the Board's stated reason for an inmate's parole denial. 89 That court recognized a critical distinction between the "shall/unless" language of Greenholtz's Nebraska statute and the "shall not/if' wording contained
in section 1003-3-5(c). According to the district court, the "unique
structure" of the Nebraska statute directly vested in a prisoner a
right to parole; the Illinois statute did not.90 Without a statecreated right to parole, the district court held that an Illinois prisoner possessed no protectible liberty interest that can be violated by the state's denial of parole. 91
In a brief footnote, Scott dismissed the district court's reliance
on the precise "shall/unless" language of the Nebraska statute
as a "narrow reading of Greenholtz."92 The Seventh Circuit thus
ignored the fact that Greenholtz invites a narrow reading, 93 and

making a comprehensive determination. Id., 356 N.E.2d at 805.
85. The Prisoner Review Board has maintained discretionary authority to grant
parole-release since 1927. A. BRUCE, A. HARNO, E. BURGESS & J. LANDESCO, THE WORKINGS OF THE INDETERMINATE-SENTENCING LAW AND THE PAROLE SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS 45

(1968).
86. 669 F.2d at 1189 n.4.
87. "[Tjhe sufficiency of... [a] claim of entitlement must be decided by reference to
state law." Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,344 (1976).
88. See infra note 89. For unpublished district court decisions holding that the Illinois
parole-release statute created no liberty interest, see, e.g., Sanders v. Illinois Prisoner
Review Bd., No. 80-963, (N.D. 111. Jan. 13,1981); Burns v. Irving, No. 80-337 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
24, 1980); Parisie v. Irving, No. 80-131 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 1980).
89. United States ex reL McCalvin v. Irving, 504 F. Supp. 368 (C.D. ll. 1980).
90. Id. at 370.
91. Id.
92. 669 F.2d at 1188 n.3.
93. 'M~e emphasize that this statute has unique structure and language and thus
whether any other state statute provides a protectible entitlement must be decided on a
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that subsequent Supreme Court cases have reinforced the limited
94
scope of that decision.
Scott: What Process Is Due?
Having construed the Illinois parole statute to confer a liberty
interest upon an eligible inmate, the Seventh Circuit's next task
in Scott was to decide what procedural protection of that interest
the Constitution required. Ignoring Greenholtz's explicit holding
that due process does not require the Parole Board to "specify the
particular 'evidence' in the inmate's file or at his interview" on
which it based a parole-release decision, 95 the Seventh Circuit
returned to its controlling law prior to Greenholtz. That law
required that each decision denying release be accompanied by
"both the grounds for the decision . . .and the essential facts

upon which the Board's inferences are based." 96 Scott held the
statement of reasons given by the Parole Board 97 constitutionally insufficient because the statement failed to indicate that the
Board actually considered the inmate's specific conduct, and not
just the statutory offense for which the inmate was convicted.
The court recognized that "Greenholtz makes clear" that due
process does not require the Parole Board to specify the particu98
lar "evidence" it relied upon in its discretionary determination.
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit required the Illinois Prisoner
Review Board to inform the inmate "what in his record was felt
by the Board to warrant his denial and why," thereby affording
inmates the exact procedure Greenholtz held constitutionally
unnecessary. 99 Unlike the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit
neglected to consider the likelihood of an erroneous decision in
terms of the entire system of procedural safeguards currently
employed by the Board. 100 Rather, the Seventh Circuit reformulated its own perception of minimum due process requirements: "We think any reason for denial necessarily assumes
some facts or facts about the inmate's case. It is this fact or facts

case-by-case basis." Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
95. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15.
96. See supra note 68.
97. See supra text accompanying note 67.
98. 669 F.2d at 1190.
99. Id. at 1190-91.
100. See, e.g., ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-4, -3-5 (1982).
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that the Board should include in its statement of reasons." 10 1
Walker: The Seventh Circuit'sFurtherExpansion of
ProceduralDue Process in Illinois Parole-ReleaseDecisions
In 1981, the Seventh Circuit further expanded the procedural
protections afforded Illinois prisoners in parole-denial determinations contrary to the Supreme Court's policy of minimal judi0 2 the court held that the
cial intervention. In Walker v. Irving,1
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the Prisoner Review Board to grant inmates the opportunity to review
10 3
the entire file considered in the decision to deny parole-release.
The Seventh Circuit based its holding on a Board rule entitling
parole candidates access to all documents considered in the
parole-release decision. 10 4 The court reasoned that the Board's
rule "creates for parole candidates a justified expectation of
access, and that it specifies precisely an element of due process."10 5 In addition, the court stated that "we need not determine on our own what due process requires [because] the requirements of Rule IV-C recognize and implement the Board's constitutional obligation to accord parole candidates due process in
10° 6
connection with denials of parole.
Two difficulties are presented by the approach taken in Walker.
First, the opinion appears to confuse the two separate steps of
due process analysis. The court looked to Board rules to determine the amount of procedural protection constitutionally required without analyzing whether the Illinois procedures already
available to the parole candidate sufficiently minimized the risk
of erroneous decision making. Greenholtz identified this inquiry
as critical to determining the amount of procedural protection
constitutionally required in a particular situation. 10 7 Instead,
Walker focused solely upon the Board's rule as creating a "justi-

101.
102.
103.
104.

Scott, 669 F.2d at 1191 n.7.
694 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 503.
Rule IV-C reads in pertinent part: "A parole candidate shall have access to all

documents which the Board considers in denying parole or setting a release date." Ill.
Admin. Reg., vol. II, no. 44.
105.
106.

694 F.2d at 503.
" Te function of legal process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution,

and in the realm of fact finding, is to minimize the risk of erroneous decision." Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13. See also supra note 25.
107. 442 U.S. at 12.
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fled expectation of access,"'' 0 8 in a manner similar to the Supreme
Court's initial determination of whether a state parole statute
provides a justified expectation of early release. 1°9
In essence, the court asserted an inmate's abstract interest in
insuring that his file contains accurate information, without
analyzing whether the claim of access was constitutionally necessary in light of Illinois' available procedural protections. 110 In
addition, the opinion failed to determine whether the requirement imposes an undue burden on the parole authority or
whether the state has a legitimate interest against allowing such
parole candidate access to all the information contained in his
file."' By not addressing the appropriate inquiry, the federal
court imposed the Rule of Access as a procedural safeguard onto
discretionary state parole determinations without evaluating
whether it was constitutionally required.
This imposition raises a second problem with the Walker
analysis: whether the Seventh Circuit determined that the
Board's Rule of Access, which the Board decided not to follow in
this particular situation, was constitutionally mandated is unclear. At one point, the court stated it need not decide the
issue, 112 yet it later stated that the Rule fulfilled the state's "due
process obligations" to parole candidates. 113 If the court of appeals was defining the scope of due process by state legislation,
that suggests that if the Board abrogated its Rule, fulfillment of

108. 694 F.2d at 503.
109. See, e.g., ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1003-3-4, -3-5 (1982). As support for the proposition that Illinois parole candidates incur a sufficient risk of parole denial based on
erroneous information contained in inmates' files, the Seventh Circuit referred to Justice
Marshall's dissent in Greenholtz: "[Ok occasion, 'researchers and courts have discovered
many substantial inaccuracies' in prisoner records." Walker, 694 F.2d at 503. Although
the court correctly stated that "[tihe relevant [due process] inquiry is whether ... the
combination of procedures available to the parole candidate is sufficient to minimize the
risk that a decision will be based on incorrect information," it did not even mention other
procedures available to Illinois parole candidates. Id. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976) (procedural due process need not be so comprehensive as to preclude the
possibility of error). See also Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12-13 (the scope of protection
required by the fourteen amendment depends upon the risk of erroneous decision-making
that results from protections currently in existence).
110. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (discussion of the considerations in determining the process due in the penal context: "[T]here must be mutual
accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the
Constitution that are of general application.").
111. Walker, 694 F.2d at 503.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 504.
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its provisions would no longer be constitutionally required. On
the other hand, if Walker determined that the Board merely
promulgated a Rule of Access in recognition of a constitutional
due process requirement, the court did not address the appropriate inquiry. Other than making a general statement that the
danger of inaccurate information existing in parole candidates'
records is "not significant,"' 14 the court never discussed whether
current Illinois procedures sufficiently minimized that risk of
error.'15
The Seventh Circuit's analysis of the constitutional sufficiency
of the statement of reasons accompanying Walker's parole denial
is also troublesome in light of Scott. The statement of reasons
accompanying Scott's notice of parole denial was held constitutionally deficient because of the court's inability to determine
whether his release at that time would deprecate the severity of
his offense.1 16 In Walker, the Board's statement referred to the
three offenses of rape, armed robbery, and attempted murder,
and their concomitant sentences. 1 7 The court held this statement constitutionally sufficient due to the combination of the
three offenses, from which the Board "could well have concluded" that the inmate's release would deprecate the seriousness
of the offense or promote disrespect for the law." 8 Thus, denial
of parole based on the stated reason that the conviction was for
murder was held constitutionally inadequate, whereas denial of
parole based on conviction for three lesser offenses met due process. In effect, the court held a recitation of the statutory com-

114. In addition, Walker criticized, as ad hoc determinations, three circuit court opinions which refused to impose a constitutional right of access because the procedures
available under the respective parole systems sufficiently minimized the risk of error.
Walker, 694 F.2d at 503. See Schuemann v. Colorado State Bd. of Adult Parole, 624 F.2d
172 (10th Cir. 1980); Dye v. United States Parole Comm'n, 558 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam); Billateri v. United States Parole Bd. 541 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1976). The court,
however, failed to discuss the reasoning underlying any of these decisions.
115. See supra note 109.
116. Walker received the following statement of reasons for denial of parole:
The above action is taken based on the Board's feeling that parole at this time
would deprecate the seriousness of the crime for which you were convicted and
would promote disrespect for the law. This is [based] on the crimes of Rapes,
Armed Robbery and Attempted Murder, for which you received sentences ranging from 100-150 years [minimum], you do not qualify for a release under the
provisions of the new law.
Walker, 694 F.2d at 501.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 502.
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mitment offense is constitutionally insufficient if the inmate has
been convicted of only one offense, but constitutionally sufficient
if the prisoner has been convicted of more than one offense.
Moreover, that rule applies when the commitment offense is
murder, and the other offenses constitute less serious crimes.
The Ex Post Facto Clause and Illinois
Inmates' ProtectibleLiberty Interest in Parole-Release
In 1973, the Illinois legislature amended section 1003-3-5(c) of
the Illinois parole statute, providing explicit general criteria for
the Board's determination of parole-release. 119 The second criterion prohibits the Board from granting parole-release if it determines that "his release would deprecate the seriousness of his
120
offense or promote disrespect for the law."
In Welsh v. Mizell,12 1 the Seventh Circuit held that the Board
violated the ex post facto clause of the Constitution 122 when it
relied solely on the second criterion to deny parole to an inmate
incarcerated under the prior statutory provision. According to
the court in Welsh, the parole-release provision in effect before
the 1973 amendment did not permit the Board to consider principles of general deterrence in its parole-release decision. 123 The
inmate in Welsh had committed his offense in 1962, but had
been subsequently denied parole solely upon the new criterion.
The court held that Welsh was disadvantaged by this retrospective application of the additional criterion 124 and remanded the

119. See supranote 7.
120. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(cX2) (1982).
121. 668 F.2d 328 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 235 (1982).
122. "No state shall.., pass any... ex post facto law." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
A penal law contravenes the ex post facto prohibition if it is both retrospective and more
onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,
29 (1981).
123. "The severity of the offense committed and society's concern with sufficient punishment did not enter directly into the Parole Board's decision." 668 F.2d at 330. Despite
persuasive authority to the contrary, the court in Welsh stated that in its 1973 amendment, the Illinois legislature enacted "new" parole criteria based on the Model Code. But
cf. supra note 80. Although beyond the scope of this article, a strong argument can be
made that the Seventh Circuit also expanded due process protections in Welsh by erroneously concluding that § 1003-3-5(cX2) was more onerous than the law in effect at the time
of Welsh's conviction. See ILL REv. SAT. ch. 38, § 808(a) (1963), reprintedin ILL REV.
SAT. ch. 108, § 206 (1965).
124. Because § 1003-3-5(cX2) "could not have had decisive weight under the Board's
1962 procedures . . . the change in the law has worked a substantial harm to Welsh
[because] at the time of his offense, exemplary conduct during his imprisonment might
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case to the Board to consider Welsh's case by the guidelines in
effect in 1962.125

. In Horton v. Irving,126 the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois consolidated two habeas corpus petitions to determine whether denial of the petitioners' applications for parolerelease deprived them of their constitutional rights. Both petitioners had committed murder prior to the enactment of section
1003-3-5(c)(2). Each alleged the Board denied parole on the basis
of his "release at this time would deprecate the seriousness of
(his) offense and promote disrespect of the law. 127 Each candidate claimed that the Board's statement of reasons denied him
minimum due process and violated the ex post facto prohibition.128 In response to petitioners' due process claims, the Board
pointed out that the Scott opinion had analyzed the 1973 amendment to section 1003-3-5(c) in its determination that the current
statute created a constitutionally protectible liberty interest in
parole. 129 Because Welsh required the Board to treat the Horton
petitioners in accordance with the statute in effect at the time
they committed their respective crimes, the Board argued that
the court must examine the language of the old statute to determine whether due process applied. 130 The broad 1970 statutory
criteria the Board had applied to petitioners' applications for
release lacked the mandatory language necessary to create a
constitutional liberty interest in parole-release. 13' Thus, according to Greenholtz, the inmates possessed no constitutional right
to due process safeguards under the old statute.
The district court rejected the Board's analysis, holding that

well have resulted in parole." 668 F.2d at 331.

125. The court remanded Welsh's case to the Prisoner Review Board for reconsideration under the relevant guidelines. Id. at 331-32.
126. 553 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
127. Id. at 214, 215. The Board gave the following reason for parole denial:
The Board, considering all factors in your case, is denying parole at this time
because of the following reasons:
The Board has heard your case and rendered its decision in accordance with
the statute in effect at the time of your offense.
The Board, having given full consideration to all the facts and circumstances in
this case, is of the opinion that the risks involved in granting parole outweigh
the factors in favor of granting parole.
Id. at 215.
128. Id. at 217.
129. Scott, 669 F.2d at 1188.
130. Horton, 553 F. Supp. at 217.
131. Id.
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the Welsh decision "does not foreclose" the Board from applying
the present parole statute to prisoners who committed offenses
prior to 1973, but only prohibits exclusive application of factors
based on general deterrence.13 2 To support its argument, the
court relied on a recent decision 13 3 in which the Supreme Court
directed the proper procedures for remedying an ex post facto
violation. The Supreme Court directed that the case be remanded
"to permit the state court to apply, if possible, the law in the
place where his crime occurred. 1 34 In addition, the court noted
"that only the ex post facto portion of the new law is void as to
petitioner, and, therefore, any severable provisions which are not
13 5
ex post facto may still be applied to him."'
The Horton court ignored the first sentence requiring on
remand the application, "if possible," of the law in effect at the
time of the offense. Instead, the district court quoted from the
second sentence, in which the Court explained that constitutionally sound provisions of the new law "may" be applied to the
inmate. 136 From this predicate, the court concluded that the
Board "must" consider the Horton petitioners under sections
1003-3-5(c)(1) and (3) without reference to the second criterion,
37
because that criterion contravenes the ex post facto clause.
This approach enabled the court to follow Scott, affording petitioners a liberty interest in parole with its concomitant procedural protections, thereby avoiding a due process analysis of the
old provision.
After determining that petitioners had a protectible liberty
interest, the court next proceeded to determine whether the
Board's stated reasons for parole denial were constitutionally
sufficient. Horton concluded that the Board's statement of reasons did not comport with minimum due process requirements
because "it [did] not state the essential facts on the basis of
which it denied parole [and pointed] to no specific facts, circumstances of risks. '' 138 The petitioners' cases were remanded for a
39
new hearing in compliance with Scott and Welsh.

132. Id.
133.
134.

Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
Id. at 36-37 n.22 (citations omitted).

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 37.
Horton, 553 F. Supp. at 218.
Id.
Id. (quoting Ware v. Kaufman, No. 80-3209, slip op. at 2-3 (N.D. Ill.
June 3, 1982).
Horton, 553 F. Supp. at 219.
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The district court in Horton interpreted the Supreme Court's
alternative form of ex post facto relief as a constitutional requisite. The Supreme Court had stated that severable provisions of
a new law which are not ex post facto "may" be applied to a
state prisoner. Without articulating any support for its conclusion, the court transformed an optional remedy into a constitutional mandate, concluding that the Board "must" apply section
1003-3-5(c) to the parole candidates, without giving the second
criterion any effect.
Consequently, this unjustified analytical leap enabled the district court to avoid a constitutional inquiry into the statute in
effect at the time of the inmates' offenses which, in fact, was the
statute the Board applied to the inmates' application for release. 140 That statute contained no unique mandatory language
providing for presumptive parole-release. Under a Greenholtz
analysis, therefore, the court should not have found that the old
parole-release provision created a protectible liberty interest.
Burbank: How Far Can FederalCourts Stretch
Illinois Inmates' Liberty Interest in Parole?
The Illinois parole-release statute applies to a diminishing
number of eligible inmates. Only individuals convicted and sentenced before 1977 are considered for parole-release; the system
of "good-time" credits instituted in 1977 applies to inmates who
committed their offense after the 1977 amendment. 141 Nevertheless, the federal courts' expansion of due process protections
afforded Illinois parole candidates has a significant impact on
the Board with respect to the remaining prisoners eligible for
parole.
In 1980, a class action suit on behalf of all Illinois inmates in
custody as a result of sentences imposed for offenses committed
prior to 1973 was instituted in the Northern District of Illinois. In
Burbank v. Director, Department of Correction,142 the certified
class of between 600 and 900 prisoners sought an injunction or
issuance of a conditional writ of habeas corpus 143 directing the

140. See ILL REV. SWAT. ch. 38, §§ 208, 204, 206 (1965).
141. See supra note 7.
142. No. 80-3325, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1982) (memorandum opinion granting
plaintiffs motion to certify case as class action).

143.

Amendment to First Amended Complaint at 1, Burbank v. Director, Dep't of Cor-

rection, No. 80-3325 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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Board to adopt explicit criteria to guide the decision-making process in the post-Welsh hearings accorded to the members of the
class. 144 Burbank asserted that the adoption of explicit criteria is
constitutionally required to ensure that the Board does not continue to deny parole based on general deterrence criteria, in violation of Welsh. 45 The Board had reconsidered each class member for parole and had denied release for the stated reason that
"the risks associated with his parole out-weigh the benefits" of
46
granting release.
In his motion for class certification,1 47 Burbank alleged the
following question of law common to the class: "whether the
procedures which will be followed and the decision-making criteria which the Prisoner Review Board will apply in these parole
considerations [conducted pursuant to Welsh] will comport with
due process standards.'1 4 In granting the plaintiff's motion, the
court gratuitously interjected the application of Scott: "While
plaintiff does not explicitly cite it, we think United States ex rel.
Scott v. Illinois Pardon and Parole Board, is also relevant to
plaintiff's claim.... Plaintiffs claim that the criteria employed
by the Board are unduly vague may sound under Scott as well as
49
Welsh."1
The district court's interjection of Scott is unwarranted. The
issue in Burbank is whether Welsh or due process compels the
Board to issue specific criteria for parole-release decisions. 5 0
Without any justification, the court has equated general application of due process to parole-release decision-making with the
Scott holding. The class in Burbank seeks reconsideration under
the Board's pre-1973 standards, whereas Scott addressed due
process with regard to the criteria in effect after 1973. In Burbank, the court erroneously assumed that the due process protection afforded by Scott applies to inmates affected by Welsh. No

144. Each inmate of the class received a new hearing due to the Board's violation of
the ex post facto clause by stating § 1003-3-5(cX2) as a reason for parole denial. Pursuant
to Welsh, their cases were reconsidered "under the relevant guidelines." Welsh, 668 F.2d
at 332-33.
145. Burbank, No. 80-3325, slip op. at 3.
146. Id., slip op. at 2-3.
147. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(2).
148. First Amended Complaint at 8,Burbank v. Director, Dep't of Correction, No.
80-3325 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
149. Burbank, No. 80-3325, slip op. at 3 (citation omitted).
150. Horton, 553 F. Supp. at 216.
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support exists for that conclusion.
If the class in Burbank ultimately prevails on the merits, the
Illinois Prisoner Review Board will be required to supply each of
the 600 to 900 inmates entitled to new hearings under Welsh
with a statement of reasons for parole denial, incorporating particular facts from each individual file. Moreover, the basis for
such an unwieldly requirement would be the district court's sua
sponte suggestion, without any reasoned analysis, as to whether
such procedural protection is constitutionally necessary.
Heirens:FederalCourt Acts as
Super-ParoleBoard
The highly publicized and controversial case of William George
Heirens' 5 1 exemplifies the serious impact of federal court intervention in Illinois parole-release decision-making. In 1946, to
avoid the electric chair, 5 2 Heirens pleaded guilty to the dismemberment murder of six-year-old Suzanne Degnan, the brutal
slayings of two other women, and twenty-six other felonies,
including burglaries, robberies and assaults. 153 He was sen-

151. See, e.g., L. FREEMAN, "BEFORE I KiLL MORE .
(1955); 2 relive horror of 1946
slaying, Chi. Tribune, Sept. 12, 1983, at 1, col. 1 (P.M. Streak); Don't release child killer,

relatives plead, Chi. Sun-Times, Sept. 13, 1983, at 4, col. 1 (Red Streak Final); The parole
issue: When is a Killer rehabilitated?Chi. Tribune, May 1, 1983, § 19 (Persp.), at 1; For
Heirens, 37 years of waiting, Chi. Tribune, May 1, 1983, § 19 (Persp.), at 1; State acts to
block release of Heirens, Chi. Sun-Times, Apr. 27, 1983, at 1; Heirens' life exemplary in
prison without walls; 'Catch Me' Killer pleaded, Chi. Sun-Times, Apr. 27, 1983, at 4; State
is told to free Heirens,slayer of 3, Chi. Tribune, Apr. 27, 1983, at 1.
152. People v. Heirens, 4 Ill. 2d 131, 139, 122 N.E.2d 231, 236 (1954), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 947 (1955). See also For Heirens, 37 years of waiting, Chi. Tribune, May 1, §19
(Persp.), at 1; 'Catch me,' Killer pleaded, Chi. Sun-Times, Apr. 27,1983, at 4.
153. People v. Heirens, 4 Il. 2d at 133, 122 N.E.2d at 233. See generally supra note 151.
At the time of the murders, Heirens was a 17-year-old freshman at the University of
Chicago. In one murder victim's apartment, the following message was scrawled in lipstick: "For heavens sake, catch me before I kill more. I cannot control myself." L. FREEMAN, supra note 151, at 23. See also supra note 151. Upon questioning while under the
influence of sodium pentothal, Heirens recounted each of the murders with particularity,
but attributed them to the fictive persona of "George," a man whom he described as
himself. In a subsequent confession, Heirens described the sexual gratification he derived
in committing burglaries; the three brutal murders were committed during the course of
separate burglaries. 4 Ill. 2d at 136, 122 N.E.2d at 235. Heirens also re-enacted the
murders at the scenes of the crimes. A comprehensive psychiatric report found Heirens
"has a deep sexual perversion and is emotionally insensitive and unstable ... hysterically unpredictable, and most of his actions can be swayed from time to time by suggestions coming from his environment." Id. at 139, 122 N.E.2d at 236. In addition to his
detailed confessions, Heirens was convicted on the basis of handwriting analysis and
fingerprints he had left on a ransom note to the Degnan family after Suzanne had been
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tenced to three consecutive life terms in prison. The trial judge
recommended that Heirens "never be admitted to parole and
that he spend the balance of his life in the Illinois State Peniten154
tiary.' '
Incarcerated approximately thirty-seven years, Heirens has
been repeatedly denied parole by the Illinois Prisoner Review
Board. l55 Prior to the 1982 Welsh decision, the Board's accompanying rationale that Heirens's release "would deprecate the
seriousness of his offense or promote disrespect for the law" provided a sound legal basis for parole denial. l56 Pursuant to Welsh,
however, parole denial based solely upon this "general deterrence" criterion of section 1003-3-5(c) violates the ex post facto
clause. 5 7 Hence, upon Heirens's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, a magistrate 58 of the Southern District of Illinois remanded the case to the Illinois Prisoner Review Board with
orders to apply "specidJ deterrence" criteria. 159 The court found
that the record suggested the Board considered Heirens completely rehabilitated; 160 therefore, if it considered Heirens unrestrangled, dismembered, and the parts of her body distributed in sewer basins. 'Catch
me,' Killer pleaded, Chi. Sun-Times, Apr. 27, 1983, at 4; State acts to block release of
Heirens,Chi. Sun-Times, Apr. 27,1983, at 1. For a detailed narrative of the interrogation
and confession, see United States ex rel. Heirens v. Pate, 405 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1968). The
Illinois Supreme Court held that Heirens's guilty pleas were not the product of any illegal
conduct of law-enforcement officials. 4 Ill. 2d at 141-42, 122 N.E.2d at 237.
Heirens nevertheless has disavowed his confession, and now maintains he was forced
to confess. "I was a victim of galloping justice. I was forced to confess," Heirens claims.
For Heirens, 37 years of waiting, Chi. Tribune, May 1, 1983 §19 (Persp.), at 1. Accord
State acts to block release of Heirens, Chi. Sun-Times, Apr. 27, 1983, at 1.
154. Official Statement of Facts, People v. Heirens, (1946) (Harold G. Ward, C.J.,
Crim. Court Cook County). The State's Attorney of Cook County concurred in the
recommendation.
155. Under the law in effect in 1946, Heirens could not have attained parole eligibility
until 2007. In 1963, an amendment to the Illinois parole-release statute made Heirens
eligible for parole. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 801.1 (1963). Since 1963, Heirens appeared
before the Board over 20 times, but was denied parole each time. Brief and Argument for
Respondents-Appellants at 5, Heirens v. Mizell, No. 83-1748 (7th Cir. filed June 17, 1983).
See infra note 165.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 121-25.
157. Interestingly, Heirens is credited with devising the basic legal analysis of Welsh.
The parole issue: When is a killer rehabilitated?Chi. Tribune, May 1, 1983, §19 (Persp.), at
1.

158. Unlike federal magistrates in the Northern District of Illinois, who handle
mainly preliminary matters, magistrates in the Southern District of Illinois conduct full
hearings. State acts to block release of Heirens,Chi. Sun-Times, Apr. 27,1983, at 1. CompareN. Dist. R. 1.70 with S. Dist. R. 29.
159. Heirens v. Mizell, No. 81-3335 (S.D. Ill. July 15,1982) (Cohn, Mag.) (order providing Heirens with new parole hearing) (hereinafter cited as Heirens 1).
160. Heirens v. Mizell, No. 81-3335 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1983) (Cohn, Mag.) (order of
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habilitated and consequently ineligible for release, the magistrate required the Board to "state this finding with particularity
and with reference to the existing record." 16 '
The Board subsequently denied parole to Heirens, because the
bizarre and brutal nature of his crimes made the "risk of further
nonconforming conduct too great to allow . . . release at this

time."' 162 Although he acknowledged that the Board's rationale
properly focused on "special deterrence," the magistrate held it
legally insufficient because it did not include any information in
the 'existing record' indicating lack of rehabilitation."'6 3 The

release) (hereinafter cited as Heirens II).
161. Heirens I, slip op. at 8. Magistrate Cohn provided the Board with the following
alternatives on remand:
(1) They could determine that although parole had been denied in recent years
solely on the basis of now-acceptable "general deterrence" criteria, that in fact
the Board has never considered Heirens to be rehabilitated, and that they
simply never bothered to state this explicitly. We did stress, however, that such
a determination would have to be explained "with particularity and with reference to the existing record."
(2) The second option on remand permitted the Board to admit that, in 1979,
Mr. Heirens was considered rehabilitated as the record suggests - but to show
that events since 1979 justified a denial of parole.
(3) The Board could grant parole, finding that Heirens is rehabilitated and no
longer susceptible to continued incarceration based on "general deterrence"
criteria because of Welsh.
Heirens II, slip op. at 9.
Magistrate Cohn implicitly assumed lack of rehabilitation to be the only legally acceptable basis for parole denial. But see § 1003-3-5(cX3) providing for parole denial if the
inmate's release "would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline."
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(cX3) (1981). Welsh held that this criterion does not violate
the ex post facto clause because, along with § 1003-3-5(c)(1), it "inviteis] the Parole Board
to look at many of the same factors as under the previous law." Welsh, 668 F.2d at 331.
The Board chose option (1), and provided an "Amended Rationale" supplementing its
decision to deny parole to Heirens. See infra text accompanying notes 162-65.
162. Heirens II, slip. op. at 9.
163. Id. Inexplicably, Magistrate Cohn appears to consider the facts of Heirens's brutal crimes not part of the 'existing record' to be considered by the Board. According to
Welsh, prior to the 1973 amendment
[tihe severity of the offense committed and society's concern with sufficient
punishment did not enter directly into the Parole Board's decision. Those factors had already determined the minimum and maximum prison terms imposed
by the sentencing judge. The minimum sentence was intended to satisfy society's desire for adequate punishment; the maximum sentence was a rough indicator of when rehabilitation could be presumed. The function of parole was to
mediate between the two extremes.
Welsh, 668 F. 2d at 330 (citing People v. Moore, 133 Ill. App. 2d 827, 829, 272 N.E.2d 270,
271 (5th Dist. 1971); People v. Lillie, 79 Ill. App. 2d 174, 178, 223 N.E.2d 716, 718-19 (5th
Dist. 1967) (emphasis added).
If Magistrate Cohn relied on Welsh in his assumption that the Board cannot consider
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Board explained that despite Heirens's excellent institutional adjustment, his behavior would be difficult to predict in an unstructured environment. 164 The magistrate, who had never personally
interviewed Heirens, challenged'that finding based on Heirens's
successful record in a work-release program. 165
Having found the Board's amended rationale legally inadequate, the magistrate again remanded Heirens's case to the
Board to justify its position that Heirens was not a suitable parole
risk. 66 Once again, the Board denied parole to Heirens, emphasizing its concern over his ability to perform adequately in an
unstructured situation, based upon "consider[ation of] many and
varied factors among which [were Heirens's] personal representations, the many documents in [his] file, the Program considerations, [his] institutional adjustment..."167 Once again, the court

Heirens's brutal crimes as part of the existing record, then his analysis is flawed. Welsh
did not state that the crimes for which the inmate was committed could not influence the
Board's decision, merely that the severity of the offense did not enter "directly" into the
parole-release determination. In point of fact, Heirens was sentenced to three consecutive
life terms, with the sentencing judge's recommendation that he never be eligible for
parole. See supratext accompanying note 154. In addition, "[ilt is permissible to consider
the relationship of the crimes committed to the likelihood of rehabilitation." Sayles v.
Welborn, No. 82-32109 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 1983) (Cohn, Mag.)
164. Heirens II, slip op. at 11. The following comments made by Board members after
personally interviewing Heirens reflect concern over the danger posed to society by Heirens's release, based on the psycho-sexual nature of his crimes and his failure to admit to
the crimes and show remorse for his acts. Conclusion by Board member Moore, Jan. 4,
1973:
In the interview, the subject presents himself extremely well. It becomes
obvious immediately that his presentation in the interview is "colored" to get
him a parole, and he says and does what he thinks will attain that end. He
comes across as an unfeeling, self-centered individual who is well controlled in
the prison community or any tightly controlled community, but what would
happen in a free situation would be markedly different.
Conclusion by Board member Dohm, Nov. 29, 1973:
The inmate denied that he committed the three murders in question. He did
admit to all but two of the burglaries... [He] had no recall regarding [previous]
statements, "Since I know I would probably go back to the same thing, it's
better that I am here." "If God wanted me not to do these things he would have
helped me-He didn't."
Brief and Argument for Respondents-Appellants at 5-6, Heirens v. Mizell, No. 83-1748
(7th Cir. filed June 17, 1983).
165. Heirens lives in a minimum security facility. He participates in a program which
permits him to work in the community by day and return to the prison at night. Id., slip
op. at 8. Each autumn since 1976, Heirens has been allowed to pick apples at nearby
private orchards. These day trips are strictly supervised. Heirens' life exemplary in prison without walls, Chi. Sun-Times, Apr. 27, 1983, at 4.
166. Heirens II, slip op. at 11.
167. Id.

19831

Illinos Parole-Release

rejected the rationale as "boilerplate" and ordered Heirens's re168
lease.
The consistent rejection of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board's
decision to deny parole to Heirens and the federal magistrate's
persistent refusal to accept the Board's accompanying rationale
represent a marked departure from the Supreme Court's holding
in Greenholtz. Due process does not require "the Parole Board to
specify the particular 'evidence' in the inmate's file or at his
interview on which it rests the discretionary determination that
an inmate is not ready for conditional release." 16 9 Yet the magistrate rejected the Board's determination that the three unusually heinous murders committed by Heirens indicate that he is
not an acceptable risk for parole despite his achievements while
incarcerated1 70 and inappropriately required the Board to "justify" its determination. Disagreeing with the Board's decision to
deny parole to Heirens, the magistrate made his own factual
finding based on information in the record, and improperly sub1 71
stituted his judgment for that of the Board.
CONCLUSION

The federal courts in Illinois have increasingly involved themselves in reviewing parole-release decisions of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board, without clear and consistent support. Each
decision strains to expand federal supervision over the Board's
discretion in parole decision-making. As the scope of minimum

168. According to Magistrate Cohn, "It is not enough for the Board simply to have
'considered' these factors; we had specifically asked the Board to go further and explain
how these considerations justified a denial of parole." Id.
169. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15.
170. In 1972, Heirens became the first prisoner in Illinois to earn a college degree
while incarcerated. For Heirens, 37 years of waiting, Chi. Tribune, May 1, 1983, §19
(Persp.), at 1. He has not received a disciplinary ticket in over 20 years. Heirens II, slip
op. at 8. Heirens submitted a transcript of his 1979 parole hearing relied upon by Magistrate Cohn, quoting the Board Chairman's response that Heirens's behavior has "probably exceeded" the Board's original expectations; nevertheless the Chairman voted for
parole denial. Id. at 7.
171. Cook County State's Attorney Richard M. Daley offered the following comment:

I'm shocked by the magistrate's decision to release William Heirens. This man
confessed to three brutal murders, and I believe he is too dangerous to walk the
streets of any city in this country.
My office has strenuously objected to Heirens' parole every time the matter
has come up. And I think the Illinois Parole Board has a better understanding
of this man's fitness to rejoin society than the federal court.
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due process protections widens, the Board must increasingly justify the sensitive "choice[s] involv[ing] a synthesis of record facts
and personal observation filtered through the experience of the
decision maker and leading to a predictive judgment as to what
is best both for the individual inmate and for the community
[based upon] a discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of
imponderables."' 172 Federal courts in Illinois should comply with
the Supreme Court's express policy against providing extensive
due process protection to inmates eligible for parole, and reverse
the trend expanding the constitutionally required procedures
imposed on the Board.
JODY WILNER

The state's attorney's office will join with the attorney general's office to
appeal this decision...
State acts to block release of Heirens, Chi. Sun-Times, Apr. 27, 1983, at 1 On Sept. 12,
1983, the Seventh Circuit heard oral arguments on Heirens v. Mfzell, No. 83-1748 (7th Cir.
filed June 17, 1983). The court has taken the case under advisement.
172. Greenholtz,442 U.S. at 8, 10.

